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In deciding Toal, the court, for the first time,9 8 held the "discovery
rule" to be applicable to medical malpractice actions arising under the
Federal Tort Claims Act,9 9 and thus the statute of limitations does not
begin to run until "the claimant has discovered, or in the exercise of
reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituted the
alleged malpractice."' 00 It would appear, however, that the court's continuous mention of the particular circumstances of the case would
indeed limit this holding to actions wherein a foreign object has negligently been left in the plaintiff's body,' 0 ' and should not be understood
as applying to all medical malpractice actions arising under federal
statute.
PENDENT JURISDICTION

The judicial inclination toward the expansion of the concept of
pendent jurisdiction 1 2 was enhanced by Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset
&Dunlap, Inc.0 s In this action for copyright infringement, unfair competition and unfair trade practices, Judge Friendly stated'0 4 that when
an unfair competition claim' 0 5 is asserted against three defendants in
one out of four counts of a complaint whose other three counts allege
copyright infringement, 10 asserted against only two of the defendants,
in Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital, 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301 N.YS2d
23 (1969), a case concerning a foreign object negligently left in the plaintiff's body.
Prior to the Flanagan decision, the law in New York as to all medical malpractice actions was that the statute of limitations commenced to run upon the patient's termination of a continuous relationship with the wrongdoing doctor or hospital. See Borgia v.
City of New York, 12 N.Y.2d 151, 187 N.E.2d 777, 237 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1962); Conklin V.
Draper, 254 N.Y. 620, 173 N.E. 892 (1980).
98 Certain other circuits have been holding this way for some time. See, e.g., Brown
v. United States, 353 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1965); Quinton v. United States, 304 F.2d 234
(5th Cir. 1962).
99 See note 93 supra.
100 438 F.2d at 224-25.
101 This decision is indeed harmonious with present New York decisional law. In
Flanagan v. Mount Eden General Hospital, 24 N.Y.2d 427, 431, 248 N.E.2d 871, 873, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23, 27, the New York Court of Appeals held that in cases "where a foreign
object has negligently been left in the patient's body, the Statute of Limitations wil not
begin to run until the patient could have reasonably discovered the malpractice." See
also Murphy v. St. Charles Hosp., 35 App. Div. 2d 64, 812 N.Y.S.2d 978 (2d Dep't 1970).
102 See 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PPAcricE
18.07, at 1951 (2d ed. 1971). Pendent jurisdiction is a type of ancillary jurisdiction. It is derived from an expansive reading
of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States. The Supreme Court
began the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in the case of Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). There the Court held that a federal court may
decide issues of state law when necessary to decide a federal question because the power
to decide a case must include the power to resolve all issues necessary to the decision.
103 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971).
104 Although this is not the holding of the case, it nevertheless is strong dictum and
in all likelihood will be followed in subsequent cases decided in the Second Circuit.
105 Such a claim is one which arises under state law.
106 Copyright infringement is a claim which arises under federal law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1388(a) (1970).
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a federal court has jurisdiction to entertain the unfair competition claim
against the third defendant if it derives from the same "common nucleus of operative fact[s]," as the related copyright infringement claim.
This test was stated in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.0 7 Thus the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine empowers a federal judge to render
judgment against a defendant in a state claim who is not a party to any
claim of which the court had independent jurisdiction, if the state claim
meets the requirements of the Gibbs rule.108
Judge Friendly applied the rule established by Gibbs which, simply
stated, holds that pendent jurisdiction exists whenever the state and
federal claims are derived from "a common nucleus of operative fact"'10 9
if the claims are such that a plaintiff would "ordinarily be expected
to try them all in one proceeding."" 0 Justice Brennan, speaking for the
Gibbs Court, reasoned that pendent jurisdiction's "justification lies in
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants.""' This objective of the Gibbs case is consistent with the Federal
Rules,"12 and although the facts in Gibbs are not identical to those in
Astor, the Court's "language and common sense considerations underlying it seem broad enough to cover" the problem presented in Astor." 3
A plaintiff with claims against three alleged conspirators for the
same set of acts "would ordinarily be expected to try them all in
one judicial proceeding," assuming that all defendants were subject
to the process of the court." 4 It would be an unjustifiable waste
107 383 US. 716, 725 (1966).

103 441 F.2d at 630. The Supreme Court in Gibbs discarded the test established in
Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 246 (1933), under which pendent jurisdiction was present
whenever "two distinct grounds in support of a single cause of action [were] alleged,"
but not where the claims constituted two causes of action. Prior to Gibbs joinder of a
pendent party was not a likely possibility since the pendent party's claim was almost

certainly a second cause of action. See United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co.,
191 F. Supp. 288 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
109 383 U.S. at 725.
110 Id.

Ill Id. at 726. Economy results from similarity in the proof offered for the federal
and nonfederal claims. Convenience results from the consolidation of pretrial procedures. Furthermore, the retention of jurisdiction over both claims may provide a greater
opportunity for settlement of the entire dispute between the parties.
112 Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 1: "These rules .... shall be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."
113 441 F.2d at 629. See Note, UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HARv. L.
Rav. 657 (1968) for an in depth analysis of the Gibbs case and related problems. See also
1 IV. BARRON & A. HoLrzoFF, FEDERAL PRAMCTCE AND PROCEDURE § 23 (C. Wright ed.
1960).
114 The court indicated in a footnote that a different problem would have occurred
if the defendant not named in the three counts under original federal jurisdiction could
have been subjected to jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York only by nationwide service of process or if venue against it would be improper. However, the
instant defendant was subject to process in the Southern District of New York, and
both the state and the federal claims "arose" in that district. Cf. 28 Us.C. § 1391 (1964).
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of judicial and professional time-indeed, a travesty on sound
judicial administration-to allow [plaintiff] to try its unfair competition claim against [two defendants] in federal court but to
require it to prosecute a claim involving precisely the same facts
against [the third defendant] in a State court a block away." 115
While the decision of the Astor court seems to be the logical conclusion of the proper application of the Gibbs rule, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite determination only
two years earlier on facts very similar to those present in Astor."16 Indeed, a highly reputable authority on this subject, Moore's Federal
Practice,has also drawn this opposite conclusion:
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction has been applied only in cases
in which the claim is against the same party against whom the
main claim is pending. It does not permit the bringing in of a
different party as to whom no federal claim can be said to be
11
pendent.
Moore's FederalPracticecites the case of Tucker v. Shawl"s as authority
for this statement. 119 Astor weakened the force of this lower court case
and thus undermines the validity of the above quoted statement.
The objective of Justice Brennan in Gibbs was to depart from a
rigid jurisdictional theory toward an economic, fair, convenient and
sound judicial administration. 2 0 Many of the federal courts have aimed
at this objective.' 2 ' The clear and unambiguous wording of the statute
115 441 F.2d at 629-30 [footnote added], citing Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.
York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
116 Williams v. United States, 405 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1969). This case involved the
joinder of defendants as to whom there was no diversity with a claim for the same
injury against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court of appeals approved the district court's dismissal of these defendants.
The various district court decisions are divided. Ellicott Machine Corp. v. Wiley
Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp. 1044 (D. Md. 1969) and Bevan v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1366 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), held against jurisdiction of a party not named
as a defendant in the copyright, patent or trademark claim. American Foresight of
Philadelphia Inc. v. Fine Arts Sterling Silver, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 656 (ED. Pa. 1967)
held for federal jurisdiction.
117 3A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcricE
18.07, at 1952 (2d ed. 1971). See also Note,
UMW v. Gibbs and Pendent Jurisdiction, 81 HA~v. L. REv. 657, 664 (1968).
118 308 F. Supp. I (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
119 3A J. MooRE, FEDERA PRAcricE
18.07, at 1952 n.Sa (2d ed. 1971).
120 383 U.S. at 726.
121 Vanderbloom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970); Ortman v. Stanray Corp.,
371 F.2d 154 (7th Cir. 1967); Sauls v. Hutto, 304 F. Supp. 124 (E.D. La. 1969); Spotted
Eagle v. Blackfeet Tribe, 301 F. Supp. 85 (D. Mont. 1969); In re Union Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. of Souderton, Pa., 298 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Chapiewsky v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 297 F. Supp. 33 (W.D. Wis. 1968); American Foresight of Philadelphia,
Inc. v. Fire Arts Sterling Silver, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 656 (E.D. Pa. 1967); Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania v. Brown, 260 F. Supp. 323 (ED. Pa. 1966); United States v. P.J. Carlin
Constr. Co., 254 F. Supp. 637 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
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on this subject upholds jurisdiction. 2 2s And the result of interpreting the
12 3
statute in this manner is manifestly desirable.
PERSONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS

Three recent Second Circuit cases have illuminated the shadowy
contours of federal jurisdiction under Title 28, section 1343(3) of the
United States Code which states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of
citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.124
All three cases have relied on Justice Stone's formulation that the Civil
Rights' statutes confer jurisdiction only when "the right or immunity
is one of personal liberty, not dependent for its existence upon the infringement of property rights."' 25 All three cases concern rights secured
by the Constitution and not rights secured by federal laws. This disThis objective was approved in Rosado v. Wyman, 897 U.S. 397 (1970):
We are not willing to defeat the common sense policy of pendent jurisdictionthe conservation of judicial energy and the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation-by a conceptual approach that would require jurisdiction over the primary claim at all stages as a prerequisite to the resolution of the pendent claim.
397 U.S. at 405.
12228 U.S.C. § 1388(b) (1964) states:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting
a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim
under the copyright, patent or trademark laws.
Except for section 1338(b) pendent jurisdiction has been a judicial doctrine. The
American Law Institute included statutory treatment of pendent jurisdiction in its suggested revision of title 28. AU, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDIcTrON BETWEEN STATE
AND FEDERAL CouRTs § 1313(a) (Tent. Draft No. 5, May 2, 1967):
ahe court shall have jurisdiction to determine all claims arising under State
law that arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transacactions or occurrences as the federal claim, defense, or counterclaim, if such a
determination is necessarily in order to give effective relief on the federal claim
or counterclaim or if a substantial question of fact is common to the claims
arising under State law and to the federal claim, defense, or counterclaim.
123 With the state courts complaining about their small budgets and large case
loads, it would not be unreasonable for the federal courts to assume their obligation
to absorb their share of the cases. Moreover, the objective of a "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action" will be better served if an entire dispute can be
resolved by one court.
124 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). This section has no jurisdictional amount requirement,
unlike the general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), which requires that
the amount in controversy exceed the sum or value of $10,000.
125 Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 531 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring). Justice Stone's
formulation is criticized in Note, The ProperScope of the Civil Rights Act, 66 HAv. L.
REv. 1285, 1288-91 (1953).

